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Between Here and There: Buffer Zones in
International Law
Eian Katzt
INTRODUCTION
On a December morning in 2015, H.A. left early from his
home in central Gaza to tend to his fields of wheat, barley, peas,
and fava beans a couple hundred meters from the Israeli border
fence. He arrived to find a low-flying Israeli aircraft spewing a
thick, white substance over his farmland as it traveled south
along the Palestinian side of the divide. Two days later, H.A.
observed signs of damage to the leaves of his plants. Within ten
days, his entire crop had shriveled and died, leaving him without
his only source of income and unable to repay a loan for agricul-
tural inputs.1
Like many Palestinians, a substantial portion of H.A.'s lands
lies within the Israeli-imposed "no-go zone" inside the Gaza Strip,
which in recent years has also been converted into a "no-grow
zone" for farmers.2 Facing threats of rocket attacks, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), and border infiltration, Israel sprays
herbicides throughout this area in order to preserve a clear line
of sight.3 Access to certain areas is restricted entirely, with Israel
regularly firing on encroaching Palestinians, civilians and mili-
tants alike.4 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have issued contra-
dictory pronouncements as to the precise boundaries and rules of
t BA 2013, Yale University; JD Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1 Israel Sprays Gazan Farmland Close to Border Fence, Destroying Crops and Caus-
ing Heavy Losses (B'Tselem, Feb 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/56FA-2NGZ. For
additional reports of Israeli planes spraying pesticide on Palestinian farmland, see Belal
Aldabbour, Israel Spraying Toxins over Palestinian Crops in Gaza (Al Jazeera, Jan 19,
2016), archived at http://perma.c/8AV3-V8VH; Gaza Farmers: Israel Sprayed Herbicides
in the Gaza Strip Again (Gisha, Jan 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/4S2G-TU2X.
2 Michael Schaeffer Omer-Man, IDF Admits Spraying Herbicides inside the Gaza
Strip (+972, Dec 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G25N-YKWY.
3 Id.
4 No-Go Zones near Gaza Strip Perimeter Fence (B'Tselem, Oct 14, 2012), archived
at http://perma.cc/EUN2-L6SQ ("Between September 2005 and the end of September
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the no-go zone,5 but Gazan farmers have found it wisest to aban-
don most lands within one hundred meters of the border.6 Those
who approach an even more intermediate range do so at great
peril-dozens of Palestinian civilians have been killed and hun-
dreds injured by IDF munitions in this murky region since Israel
withdrew from Gaza in 2005.7
Gaza's no-go zone is an instance of a familiar tool in interna-
tional politics: the buffer zone. Long favored as a means of defus-
ing conflict, buffer zones have been employed on nearly every
continent over the course of history. An early European applica-
tion was the "neutral ground" that separated Spanish and British
encampments in Gibraltar in the eighteenth century.8 Other
notable, bygone examples include those established by the Concert
of Europe (in the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Switzerland),9 the
Treaty of Versailles (German Rhineland),O the Tanggu Truce
(Chinese Manchuria)," and the Geneva Conference (North and
South Vietnam).12 Buffer zones were inaugurated as conditions of
the independence of Norway from Sweden's and of several Baltic
states from Russia.14
2012, Israeli security forces killed 213 Palestinians near the fence. At least 154 of those
killed were civilians not taking part in hostilities.").
5 IDF Spokesman Provides Contradictory Answers Regarding the Width of the 'No-
Go Zone" Which Residents of the Gaza Strip Are Prohibited from Entering (Gisha), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4UFW-JWPP (describing a series of contradictory statements
from IDF sources as to the extent and accessibility of the Gaza buffer zone); Noam Sheizaf,
IDF: 'Forbidden Zone' in Gaza Three Times Larger Than Previously Stated (+972, May 12,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/FX9G-3Y8G.
6 See Israel Sprays Gazan Farmland (cited in note 1).
7 See Within Range: An Analysis of the Legality of the Land "Buffer Zone" in the
Gaza Strip *9 (Diakonia, Aug 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4J2V-5J8U ("From
January to May [2011] alone, at least 19 civilians-men, women and seven children-were
killed and 252 others were injured including 73 children."); Torture and Other Forms of
Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment against the Palestinian Population in Gaza Strip
by IOF *31 (Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, July 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/
S7AU-7SPA (documenting 26 killings and 142 injuries over a two-year period).
8 See Chris Grocott and Gareth Stockey, Gibraltar: A Modern History ix, 11
(Wales 2012).
9 See Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable
Peace 193 n 11 (Princeton 2010).
10 See Martin S. Alexander, The Military Consequences for France of the End of
Locarno, 22 Intelligence & Natl See 563, 563 (2007).
11 See Peter Worthing, A Military History of Modern China 117 (Praeger 2007).
12 See Brent Langhals, Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), in Spencer C. Tucker, ed, Ency-
clopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History 157, 157 (ABC-
CLIO 1998).
13 See Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends at 115 (cited in note 9).
14 See Peter N. Stearns, ed, Demilitarization in the Contemporary World 4 (Illinois 2013).
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In modern times, similar and long-standing arrangements
can be found in regions as diverse as Cyprus, Korea, and Sinai.15
On one hand, the appeal of creating distance between hostile
states-either by mutual agreement, unilateral withdrawal, or
forcible population removal-is obvious: if, as realists theorize,
states are conceived as opaque "billiard balls" colliding with one
another in an anarchic world order,16 then buffer zones provide a
layer of cushioning between them. Yet while realists tend to focus
on state actors,17 buffer zones also provide capacity for dealing
with nonstate actors, allowing governments to "pursue rebels or
terrorists"18 beyond their territorial borders or, alternatively, to
patronize fifth columns19 in enemy states.
In either sense, the establishment of a buffer zone necessarily
entails a sacrifice of sovereignty, whether willful or not, and often
bears disastrous consequences for civilians like H.A. caught
within. From an international-law standpoint, H.A. could theo-
retically pursue a variety of legal avenues in a claim against
Israel, invoking the UN Charter's guarantee of state sovereignty
(bracketing momentarily the issue of Palestinian statehood), the
Geneva Conventions' safeguard of civilians in armed conflicts,
and international customary law's protection of private property
rights.
But the enigmatic nature of buffer zones leaves the applica-
bility of these sources of law-and thus the legal remedies avail-
able to impacted civilians-very much in doubt. Neither zones of
war nor peace, neither fully sovereign nor militarily occupied,
buffer zones seem to fall through the cracks of international law,
"function[ing] in a legal grey area whereby jus ad bellum orjus in
bello norms are temporarily suspended."20 As a result, little legal
15 See Lionel Beehner and Gustav Meibauer, The Futility of Buffer Zones in Interna-
tional Politics, 60 Orbis 248, 248 (2016).
16 Stephen D. Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous
Variables, 36 Intl Org 497, 498-99 (1982).
17 See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 98-99
(McGraw-Hill 1979) (focusing on the relationship between state actors in a systems theory
of international politics).
18 Beehner and Meibauer, 60 Orbis at 251 (cited in note 15).
19 A "fifth column" is defined as "a group of secret sympathizers or supporters of an
enemy that engage in espionage or sabotage within defense lines or national borders."
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 466 (11th ed 2003).
20 Beehner and Meibauer, 60 Orbis at 251 (cited in note 15).
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action has been taken with respect to the rights of civilians within
buffer zones. 21
This ambiguity persists primarily because the law of buffer
zones has yet to receive focused legal attention as a field of its
own, both from a "jus ad buffer zone" and a "jus in buffer zone"22
perspective. This Comment fills that gap by providing a concep-
tual framework to classify different modes of buffer zones and to
assess their legal consequences. Part I presents a novel definition
of international buffer zones, emphasizing the loss-of-sovereignty
aspect. With this concept in mind, Part II develops the conditions
under which introducing a buffer zone might be sanctioned under
international law. Part III then addresses the governing law
within buffer zones, focusing on restrictions of civil rights, the
destruction of property, and the rules of military engagement.
Finally, Part IV considers whether civilians adversely affected by
the operation of a buffer zone could pursue a legal remedy against
the state responsible under an international-law takings theory.
This Comment utilizes case studies throughout its exploration to
illustrate real-world applications of legal principles.
I. DEFINING A BUFFER ZONE
Created primarily in response to external pressures, the
strategic value of buffer zones is typically perceived as defensive.23
The billiard-ball mode24 suggests that good fences make good
neighbors, which explains why buffer zones have frequently been
created as components of armistice agreements between warring
nations. In one sense, buffer zones can be thought of simply as
excellent fences, theoretically reducing the likelihood of interstate
conflict. In practice, however, buffer zones are not always successful
21 One notable exception is the recent attempts by Palestinian advocacy groups to
hold Israel to account for its no-go zone. See Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, Gaza Farmers Seek
Damages for Israel's Crop-Spraying (Al Jazeera, July 13, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/
Q3Z5-N7YJ; Response to Gisha's Freedom of Information Application Regarding Gaza's
"Buffer Zone" (Gisha), archived at http://perma.cc/828V-EV6Q.
22 Playing on the just war theory concepts of jus ad bellum (just cause for war) and
jus in bello (just conduct in war), "Jus ad buffer zone" and "jus in buffer zone" here are
taken to mean, respectively, just cause for the establishment of a buffer zone and just
conduct within a buffer zone.
23 For a synthesis of the various functions of buffer zones, see Beehner and Meibauer,
60 Orbis at 251-53 (cited in note 15).
24 See Krasner, 36 Intl Org at 498 (cited in note 16) (using billiard balls as a
metaphor to explain the zero-sum "political interactions among states"). See also Waltz,
Theory of International Politics at 99 (cited in note 17) (setting out a systems theory of
international politics, consisting of a system and its interacting units).
[84:13791382
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in achieving this purpose-the demilitarizations of the Rhineland
after World War I,25 of Vietnam's Seventeenth Parallel after the
First Indochina War,26 of the El Caguin region in Colombia,27 and
of Kosovo's borders following Operation Allied Force28 stand as
prominent historical testaments to the failure of buffer zones to
prevent future conflict.
Apart from creating space between two hostile nations, buffer
zones offer a variety of other strategic advantages. They enhance
border integrity by better enabling states to guard against emerg-
ing national security threats from nonstate actors, especially ter-
rorism and illegal immigration.29 They may also be used to con-
tain war zones. When civil conflict erupts in one state, a buffer
zone can prevent it from spilling over into neighboring territory.0
Buffer zones can also serve a humanitarian function, cordoning
off a theater of war to provide shelter for refugees and a channel
for aid to reach beleaguered civilians.31
But buffer zones are not always inspired by such noble aims,
and they have been alternatively deployed as a pretext to broaden
a sphere of influence or pursue discrete foreign policy objectives.
Gustav Meibauer and Professor Lionel Beehner chronicle the
usage of buffer zones by the United States to funnel weapons into
South Vietnam,32 by South Africa to intervene in the Angolan civil
war,"2 and by Turkey to frustrate the national ambitions of the
25 See Alexander, 22 Intelligence & Natl Security at 563-65 (cited in note 10) (de-
scribing the disastrous consequences for France of the unilateral remilitarization of the
Rhineland by Germany).
26 See Langhals, Demilitarized Zone at 157 (cited in note 12) (recounting the frequent
violations during the Vietnam War of the demilitarized zone initially installed to "tempo-
rarily" separate the French and the Viet Minh).
27 See Michael Radu, The Perilous Appeasement of Guerillas, 44 Orbis 362, 374
(2000) (characterizing Colombia's creation of a demilitarized zone for the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia rebels (also known as FARC) as a "strategic blunder of gross
proportions" that allowed for the creation of a "state within a state").
28 See Kosovo's Lawless Border (NY Times, Mar 2, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/
3Q56-DC2T ("[A]rmed Albanian separatists have exploited a three-mile-wide demilita-
rized zone on the Serbian side of the border as a staging area for attacks on Serbian police
and civilians.").
29 Beehner and Meibauer, 60 Orbis at 250 (cited in note 15).
30 Id at 251.
31 Id at 252.
32 See Langhals, Demilitarized Zone at 157 (cited in note 12) ("During the Vietnam
War, both the United States and [North Vietnam] regularly violated the neutrality of the
DMZ by moving troops and materiel in and out of the area.").
33 See Jay Ross, S. Africa Said to Be Seeking a Buffer Zone for Namibia (Wash Post,
Sept 5, 1981), archived at http://perma.ccIY3DS-ARH9 ("South Africa's deep military pen-
etration into Angola last week apparently is part of an effort to create a rebel-controlled
2017] 1383
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Iraqi Kurds.34 Along with other scholars, they have likewise ques-
tioned Turkey's motives in advocating for a buffer zone along its
border with Syria.35
The potential for abuse in the creation and maintenance of
buffer zones calls for a rigorous legal theorization of their charac-
ter. This Part begins that endeavor by constructing a new legal
definition for the term. Part L.A critically evaluates the prevailing
understanding of buffer zones in military and international-law
discourse, suggesting that the current view is underinclusive and
descriptively incomplete. In response to these shortcomings,
Part I.B derives a revised definition founded on the accompanying
loss of sovereignty, a conception that more harmoniously accords
with conventional international legal theory.
A. Challenging Received Notions
The Geneva Conventions, the authoritative treaty body on
the law of war, specifically provide for the establishment of
"hospital and safety zones,"36 "neutralized zones,"37 and "demili-
tarized zones."38 Similar strategic configurations have likewise
buffer zone in southern Angola that would help Pretoria maintain a government to its
liking in neighboring Namibia.").
34 See Beehner and Meibauer, 60 Orbis at 262 (cited in note 15) (noting that Turkish
agreements with the Iraqi government enabled its "incursions against the autonomous
northern Kurdish regions" of Iraq).
35 See Lionel Beehner and Gustav Meibauer, Who Is Turkey Really Targeting with
Its Buffer Zone? (Wash Post, July 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RB3A-7ES2 (ar-
guing that Turkey's buffer zone is, in part, intended to "squash[ ] Kurdish separatism").
See also Tony Cartalucci, Turkey's Operation Euphrates Shield Is Shielding What? Decon-
structing Syria, Turkey's Illegal Invasion (New Eastern Outlook, Nov 14, 2016), archived
at http://perma.cc/XSY2-TR8Z (challenging several Turkish justifications for maintaining
the buffer zone); Christina Lin, Is Turkey Pulling a "Crimea" on the Syrian Buffer Zone?
(Times of Israel, Oct 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CKC6-6V5T (questioning the
logic behind the Turkish buffer zone in light of its potential effect of provoking China into
entering the Syrian war to neutralize the "threat to Chinese sovereignty").
36 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
Art 14, 1955 6 UST 3516, 3528, TIAS No 3365 (1949) ("Convention IV") (providing for the
creation of areas designed "to protect from the effects of war, wounded, sick and aged per-
sons, children under fifteen, expectant-mothers and mothers of children under seven").
37 Convention IV Art 15, 1955 6 UST at 3528 (providing for the creation of areas "in-
tended to shelter from the effects of war the following persons, without distinction:
a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants; b) civilian persons who take no part
in hostilities").
38 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts Art 60(3), 1125 UNTS 3, 31
(June 8, 1977, entered into force Dec 7, 1978) ("Protocol r):
[Alny zone which fulfils the following conditions: (a) all combatants, as well as
mobile weapons and mobile military equipment, must have been evacuated;
1384 [84:1379
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won recognition in national legislation and in various military
manuals.39 But the legal and military understandings of these
terms do not align with modern reality. Specifically, existing
definitions tend to be underinclusive, failing to account for a
number of different types of buffer zones not matching their strict
conditions. Additionally, these conceptions treat buffer zones as
monolithic entities, when they in fact vary greatly in purpose,
restrictiveness, and mutuality.
1. Underinclusiveness.
The Geneva Conventions are the starting point in any evalu-
ation of the international law of armed conflict. As noted above,
they explicitly contemplate the formation of three distinct classes
of buffer zones. However, these zones are limited in application
for two primary reasons. First, they require a formal pact among
the concerned parties4 whereas many buffer zones are in fact
effectuated by unilateral imposition or de facto neutralization, as
discussed in greater detail below. Second, and more consequen-
tially, later commentary parsing the Geneva Conventions con-
cludes that the drafters intended these zones to encompass only
temporary, wartime measures, not the sort of long-term, mixed-
status installations produced by treaty or stalemate that are com-
monly found around the world today.41 The intended imperma-
nency of the zones delineated in the Conventions is immediately
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population;
and (d) any activity linked to the military effort must have ceased.
39 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, Rules 35-36 at 119-21 (Cambridge 2005) (outlining
rules that prohibit directing an attack against a zone intended to "shelter the wounded"
or a "demilitarised zone agreed upon between the parties").
40 See Protocol I Art 60(2), 1125 UNTS at 30-31 ("The agreement shall be an express
agreement [and] may be concluded verbally or in writing."); Convention IV Art 14, 1955 6
UST at 3528 ("[T]he Parties concerned may conclude agreements on mutual recognition of
the zones and localities they have created."); Convention IV Art 15, 1955 6 UST at 3516
("[A] written agreement shall be concluded and signed by the representatives of the Parties
to the conflict.").
41 See Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann, eds, Commen-
tary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 $¶ 2301-02 at 709 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987):
Finally there is a third category of demilitarized zones: those established follow-
ing an armistice, which are generally known as "buffer zones". The main objec-
tive of such zones is to prevent the adverse armed forces from being in contact,
and they are often placed under the authority of an armistice commission, or in
some cases, of a peacekeeping force of the United Nations. The best known recent
13852017]1
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apparent from the restriction on their usage to military opera-
tions.42 It is further highlighted by a provision instantly dissolving
a demilitarized zone if a party violates its terms, 43 rather than
providing for an abiding enforcement mechanism enabling its per-
petual endurance. Buffer zones that are abrogated by any mun-
dane breach are not destined to last long.44 In short, the buffer
zones envisioned by the Geneva Conventions, quite apart from
most zones today, "have a humanitarian and not a political aim;
they are specially intended to protect the population living there
against attacks."45
Certain military definitions have been more agnostic as to the
inaugural conditions and longevity of buffer zones. The US
Department of Defense (DOD) construes a buffer zone as "1. A
defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which
disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded" or "2. A desig-
nated area used for safety in military operations."46 These two
separate definitions better reflect both the humanitarian and
political purposes of buffer zones. The latter closely resembles the
Conventions' safety zones and neutralized zones. While the
Conventions treat these structures as discrete phenomena, they
can both fairly be ascribed the single heading of humanitarian
buffer zones, created to protect civilians in active conflict arenas.
These safety corridors effectively deny entry to armed groups
thought to pose a humanitarian risk while granting access to
state and nonstate actors ostensibly present to defend civilians.
cases are the demilitarized zones in Korea and in the Middle East between Israel
and its neighbours. It is quite clear that the drafters of Article 60 did not have
such zones in mind. . . . In fact, such different types of demilitarized zones, cre-
ated by treaty, as mentioned above, are not created for wartime but for peace-
time, or at least for an armistice.
42 See Convention IV Art 14, 1955 6 UST at 3528 (allowing for the designation of
hospital and safety zones "upon the outbreak and during the course of hostilities");
Convention IV Art 15, 1955 6 UST at 3528 (allowing for the designation of neutralized
zones "in the regions where fighting is taking place" by an agreement that "fix[es) the
beginning and the duration of the neutralization").
43 Protocol I Art 60(7), 1125 UNTS at 31 ("If one of the Parties to the conflict commits
a material breach . . . , the other Party shall be released from its obligations under the
agreement conferring upon the zone the status of demilitarized zone.").
44 Violations of the Korean DMZ have occurred with periodic regularity throughout
its seven-decade lifespan. See Seunghyun Sally Nam, War on the Korean Peninsula?
Application of Jus in Bello in the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island Attacks, 8 E Asia L Rev
43, 68-69 (2013) (detailing the imperfect compliance).
45 Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols
T 2303 at 709 (cited in note 41).
46 Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms *30 (Mar
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/U9CL-X8YK.
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In practice, they are more commonly established by the interven-
tion of parties external to the military conflict than by the
combatants themselves.47 Humanitarian buffer zones are most
familiar to Americans from US forays in Iraq48 and Kosovo,49 but
other historical examples include France's implementation of a
UN-supported cordon sanitaire in southwestern Rwanda and the
UN Security Council (UNSC) safe zone in southern Iraq during
the Gulf War.5o More recently, the United States and Turkey have
been openly mulling the designation of a humanitarian buffer
zone within Syria for several years.5' Turkey began implementa-
tion in late 2016.52
The first DOD definition builds on the Conventions by provid-
ing a category of more durable, nonhumanitarian buffer zones,
which this Comment refers to as political buffer zones. Rather
than merely offering safe harbor for civilians ensnared by conflict,
these arrangements are designed to achieve strategic domestic
and foreign policy objectives. The DOD's functionalist definition-
"[a] defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which
disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded"-describes
the basic concept but does not capture the full meaning and
nuance of the term "political buffer zone" for the purposes of this
Comment.
In the first place, "control[] by a peace operations force" is
not a prerequisite to a political buffer zone. The imposition of a
buffer zone may just as well be an act of aggression rather than
an act of peacemaking, as in the case of Russia's "frozen conflicts"
47 Humanitarian intervention, which has gained moral and legal force with the emer-
gence of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, often practically involves coordinated
action under the auspices of the UN or other regional alliances. For examples drawn from
Iraq, Rwanda, and Bosnia, see Parts IIA, II.C, and III.D, respectively.
48 See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 Georgetown L J
173, 182-84 (2004) (developing the legal grounds for and the limits of the American-
imposed buffer zone in southern Iraq during Operation Desert Storm based on the zone's
purpose of restoring the peace in the area).
49 See Arie Bloed, The OSCE Involvement in the Deteriorating Conflict in Kosovo, 12
Helsinki Monitor 136, 136 (2001) (discussing the six-kilometer-wide buffer zone between
Kosovo and Yugoslavia enforced by NATO).
50 See Beehner and Meibauer, 60 Orbis at 252-53 (cited in note 15) (discussing these
buffer zones as primarily animated by humanitarian, rather than strategic, concerns).
51 See Turkey and US 'Planning Buffer Zone'in Northern Syria (BBC, July 27, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/546G-NQCG.
52 See Dion Nissenbaum, Turkey's Push to Expand Safe Zone in Syria Risks Slowing
Fight against ISIS (Wall St J, Nov 25, 2016), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkeys
-push-to-expand-safe-zone-in-syria-risks-slowing-fight-against-isis- 1480069805 (visited Feb
28, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
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along its borders (which, although they once featured buffer
zones, have today mostly transformed into boots-on-the-ground
occupations).53 The term "peace operations force" also seems to
imply the involvement of a neutral, third party, which is not
always the case. Sometimes political buffer zones are indeed
enforced by multilateral peacekeeping bodies, such as the United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)4 or the
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) patrolling the Sinai
Peninsula.55 Other buffer zones, however, are policed by the par-
ties themselves, as exemplified by the de-weaponized frontier
separating Sudan and South Sudan.56 Notably, the Sudanese
example would not be considered a buffer zone under either the
DOD definition (because it has no functioning "peace operations
force") nor the Conventions' definition (because it was installed
by armistice rather than in the course of an ongoing "military
effort"). This oversight illustrates the misalignment of these defi-
nitions with state practice owing to their confining particularities.
2. Descriptive limitations.
Apart from simply missing buffer zones, a further limitation
of the DOD and Conventions definitions is their inability to con-
vey the variance in mutuality and restrictiveness among buffer
zones.57 Some buffer zones are the mutually accepted outcome of
bilateral or multilateral negotiations. The 1920 Svalbard Treaty
limiting Norwegian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago,58 the
53 Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker, Putin's Frozen Conflicts (Foreign Policy,
Feb 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/E7UW-YR66 (noting that Russia maintains mil-
itary bases in the "breakaway territories" of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria).
64 See Contributing to a Political Settlement in Cyprus (United Nations, 2011), ar-
chived at http://perma.ccIM9QV-NY3A (providing details of the organization's functions).
55 See About Us (Multinational Force and Observers), archived at http://perma.cc/
HC76-5BBJ (discussing the origins and mission of the MFO).
56 See Sudan Bombs South Sudan Buffer Zone (News24, Sept 8, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/KD6M-5R9Z (describing the Sudanese Armed Forces' bombing of a South
Sudanese army position a year after the parties had agreed to demilitarize the region).
57 The Geneva Conventions do in fact require mutuality in that hospital and safety
zones, neutralized zones, and demilitarized zones may be crafted only by formal agree-
ment. The DOD definitions are not so restrictive, but they lack the nuance that is added
by this Comment.
58 See Christopher R. Rossi, 'A Unique International Problem": The Svalbard Treaty,
Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History, 15
Wash U Global Stud L Rev 93, 95 (2016) (describing the unique status of Svalbard, an
archipelago nominally under Norwegian sovereignty but providing for "equal enjoyment"
and "equal liberty of access" to the other forty-two signatories to the treaty).
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1978 Camp David Accords that precipitated the MFO,59 and the
1983 pact between Turkey and Iraq allowing for cross-border
intrusions in hot pursuit of Kurdish rebels6o represent arrange-
ments of this type. Others, like Gaza's aforementioned no-go zone,
South Africa's meddling in Angola in the 1980s, 6 1 or the many
humanitarian missions of the 1990s,62 are externally imposed
without the consent of the affected population or its government.
Nearly all humanitarian buffer zones are externally imposed. The
thirty-kilometer buffer zone between Ukraine and its breakaway
eastern provinces represents a hybrid category, ostensibly bro-
kered in a multilateral ceasefire deal but owing only to severe
pressure from Russian-backed separatists.3 It is not clear
whether this buffer zone should be thought of as mutually ac-
cepted (because Ukraine formally acceded to it) or externally
imposed (because it has resulted in the effective Russian annexa-
tion of Ukrainian territory).
The Ukrainian case highlights another important distinction
between buffer zones that span the border between two states and
buffer zones carved out from within the territory of one state.
While Ukraine's categorization is debatable, Egypt provides a less
ambiguous example of an internally crafted buffer zone, having
demolished thousands of homes along its Gazan border in hopes
of eliminating smuggling routes and terrorism tunnels.64 Like-
wise, Spain has constructed a series of fences ringing the cities of
59 See David Schenker, America's Least-Known Mideast Military Force (Politico, Nov
1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/27VA-FDCD (describing Egypt and Israel's coopera-
tion in establishing the MFO with the support of twelve other nations after China and
Russia vetoed a proposed Security Council mission).
60 See Brendan O'Leary and Khaled Salih, The Denial, Resurrection, and Affirmation
of Kurdistan, in Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, eds, The Future of
Kurdistan in Iraq 3, 8-9 (Pennsylvania 2005) (describing Iraq's acquiescence to the Turkish
government's steadfast insistence on "the right to pursue" Kurdish nationalist groups into
Iraqi territory).
61 See Ross, S. Africa Seeking a Buffer Zone (cited in note 33) (discussing various
tactics taken by South Africa to destabilize Angola).
62 During the 1990s, humanitarian buffer zones were established by Operation Provide
Comfort (Iraq, 1991), the Unified Task Force (Somalia, 1991), Operation Turquoise
(Rwanda, 1994), and the United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia, 1993-1995). See George
N. Barrie, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 118 S Afr L J 155, 157-
61 (2001).
63 Alexander Kolyandr, Ukraine Signs Deal with Rebels to Create Buffer Zone; Agree-
ment Is Aimed at Reinforcing Cease-Fire Agreement Signed in Early September (Wall St J,
Sept 20, 2014), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-signs-deal-with-rebels-to
-create-buffer-zone-1411207014 (visited Mar 31, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
64 See Egypt 'Demolishes Thousands of Homes' for Sinai Buffer Zone (BBC, Sept 22,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6Z5R-HJKS.
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Ceuta and Melilla, its North African outposts, to stem the tide of
migration flowing through Morocco.65 These buffer zones are self-
imposed.
Finally, while the DOD accurately conceives of buffer zones
as areas from which "disputing or belligerent forces have been ex-
cluded," it fails to appreciate the wide range in the level of restric-
tiveness within them. At the far extreme are exclusionary buffer
zones from which all people are forbidden from entering. An exam-
ple of this type is the UN buffer zone in Cyprus, where the decaying
Nicosia International Airport attests to decades of human aban-
donment.66 Alternatively, demilitarized buffer zones exclude only
military personnel and equipment. Civilians may be able to enter
such zones freely or conditionally, or may even reside within
them. The villages of Taesung-dong, South Korea; Jau, South
Sudan; and Svetlodarsk, Ukraine are situated entirely within
demilitarized buffer zones.
The table below categorizes some modern-day buffer zones
based on these distinguishing features:
65 See Raphael Minder, At Spanish Enclave, a Debate over What Makes a Border (NY
Times, Nov 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/RA7A-HPLB.
66 See Alan Taylor, Frozen in Tinme: The Cyprus Buffer Zone (The Atlantic, Apr 10,
2014), online at http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/04/frozen-in-time-the-cyprus-buffer
-zone/100714 (visited May 7, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
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TABLE 1. CATEGORIZING PRESENT DAY BUFFER ZONES67
Exclusionary Demilitarized
North Korea-South Korea,
Mutually Accepted, Cyprus-Northern Israel-Egypt (Sinai),
Externally Enforced Cyprus Israel-Syria
(Golan Heights)
Sudan-South Sudan,
Mutually Accepted Iraq-Kuwait vTurkey-Greece
and Enforced (certain Aegean Islands),
Svalbard, Ukraine-Russia68
Externally Imposed Israel-Gaza, Turkey-Syria
and Enforced "shoot on sight" zones 69  (humanitarian buffer zone)
Egypt-Gaza,Self-Imposed and Sp-Morcc
EnforcedSpain-Morocco
(Ceuta and Melilla)
B. Formulating a New Definition
The observed diversity in the formation and maintenance of
international buffer zones leads this Comment to adopt a broader
formulation: a buffer zone is a region in which the territorial sov-
ereign has, willingly or unwillingly, forfeited aspects of its auton-
omy due to external pressure or humanitarian intervention.70 The
67 This table is not exhaustive and does not include all buffer zones that exist in an
informal or de facto sense.
68 As noted above, the mutuality of the buffer zone in Ukraine's Donetsk and
Luhansk provinces defies easy categorization. While a formal agreement exists, it was
brokered under highly coercive conditions. See note 63 and accompanying text.
69 See, for example, Shoot-on-Sight Orders over Illegal Entry from Afghanistan
(Dawn, Feb 19, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5L54-74UX (describing the suspension
of traffic and transit via a shoot-on-sight order by Pakistani border officials reacting to a
suicide attack on a Pakistani city); Saudi Border Guards Get Shoot on Sight Orders (Yahoo,
Jan 19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HJG3-Q35K (reporting on the shoot-on-sight
orders given to Saudi border guards patrolling the southern border with Yemen and the
northern border with Iraq after three border guards were killed as a result of a clash with
four Saudi infiltrators); Jack Moore, Ebola Outbreak: Liberian Army Ordered to "Shoot on
Sight"Anyone Crossing Sierra Leone Border (Intl Business Times, Aug 19, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/WS68-WH9L; Brad Adams, India's Shoot-to-Kill Policy on the Bangladesh
Border (The Guardian, Jan 23, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/YC2F-94AN.
70 The term "buffer zone" has also been applied in the contexts of environmental con-
servation and cultural heritage preservation. See generally, for example, Gary Bentrup,
Conservation Buffers: Design Guidelines for Buffers, Corridors, and Greenways (USDA
2008); Oliver Martin and Giovanna Piatti, eds, World Heritage and Buffer Zones
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improvement that this definition makes on those offered by the
Conventions is a practical one-it allows for a fuller depiction of
the ranges in the temporality, mutuality, and restrictiveness of
buffer zones, conveying their versatility beyond their military ap-
plications. While some buffer zones are established as provisional
wartime necessities or may themselves be acts of war, others are
preventive measures or the enduring outcomes of ceasefire agree-
ments. The new definition's advantage over the DOD guidelines
is that it grounds buffer zones in the vocabulary of international
law by connecting them to a reduction in sovereignty. This link-
age has important consequences for an evaluation of buffer zones
under an international-law framework.
While there is "no established definition of sovereignty in
international law," its core elements include monopoly power over
legal authority and the nonintervention of foreign states in
domestic affairs.71 The Permanent Court of Arbitration" writes
that "[s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies inde-
pendence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the
functions of a State."73 In the case of externally imposed buffer
zones and humanitarian buffer zones, the violation of this principle
is obvious: a foreign power brazenly asserts itself on domestic ter-
ritory. The sovereignty concerns implicated by mutually accepted
or self-imposed buffer zones are subtler, however, because the for-
eign involvement is less overt. Nonetheless, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) "forbids all States or groups of States to
intervene directly or indirectly . .. on matters in which each State
is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide
freely."74 To the extent that states are compelled to carve out
buffer zones from their own territory in order to forestall the
(UNESCO 2008). While these are valid usages, this Comment focuses exclusively on polit-
ical buffer zones.
71 Irene R. Lax, Note, A State of Failure: The Sacrosanctity of Sovereignty and the
Perpetuation of Conflict in Weak and Failing States, 26 Temple Intl & Comp L J 25, 27-
28 (2012).
72 Established in 1899, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is a sparsely used, ad hoc
arbitral tribunal sitting in The Hague. Its Island of Palmas case is one of its "handful of
well-reasoned awards that have played a material role in the development of customary
international law." Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 Duke
L J 775, 797 (2012).
73 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v United States of America), 2 UN Rep Intl
Arbitral Awards 829, 838 (Permanent Ct Arb 1928).
74 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States of America), 1986 ICJ 14, 108 at 1 205.
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threat of war or of border infiltration by a neighbor, they are de-
prived of independence and unable to "decide freely" how to pro-
ductively use their land. Egypt's perceived need to evacuate ter-
ritory near Gaza in response to the threat of underground
smuggling is precisely such a loss of independence.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting from the outset what the
definition of buffer zones embraced by this Comment does not
include. Although buffer zones frequently appear along asserted
international borders,75 they do not ordinarily include a wall, un-
less combined with an accompanying loss of autonomy. Designed
primarily to stop immigration, the past decades have witnessed a
worldwide proliferation in defensive border walls, ballooning in
number from fifteen in 1989 to over seventy today.76 The legal
ramifications of this construction boom remain unclear,77 but
there are strong arguments that might justify it-the right to pro-
tect territorial integrity is firmly enshrined in international law78
whereas there is no general recognition of a "right to migrate."79
A wall may become a buffer zone if it occupies more than one
spatial dimension. A clear example of this interaction is the "shoot
on sight" policies practiced by several states to combat border infil-
tration.80 In these cases, a wall acts not only as a unidimensional
barrier to entry, but also as an effective limit on the freedom of
75 The phrase "asserted international border" is used in recognition of the fact that
buffer zones are often established along contested territorial boundaries, as in the cases of
Ukraine and Kosovo, or along the boundaries of territories not recognized as states, such
as Gaza.
76 See Reece Jones, Death in the Sands: The Horror of the US-Mexico Border (The
Guardian, Oct 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/EPT3-VJQJ.
77 See Moria Paz, Between the Kingdom and the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immi-
gration, and Border Walls, 34 Berkeley J Intl L 1, 6-7 (2016) (noting a tension between
the universal applicability of human rights and the state's authority to determine "who
may enter its domain").
- 78 See UN Charter Art 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.").
79 See Barbara Hines, The Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine
Immigration Law, 43 Cornell Intl L J 471, 472 (2010) ("[Migration is a human right-a
principle that is not found in the immigration laws of any other large immigrant-receiving
country nor explicitly in any international human rights conventions.") (citations omitted).
See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art 12, 999 UNTS 171, 176
(Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Mar 23, 1976) ("ICCPR") (establishing the right to emi-
grate, but not the right to immigrate); International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families Art 8, 2220 UNTS 3, 97
(Dec 18, 1990, entered into force June 1, 2003) (establishing the right for migrant workers
and their family to leave any State and the right to return to their State of origin).
80 See note 69.
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movement for some area across its borders. Recall here Israel's
no-go zone, which has made "17% of the Gaza Strip's total land
mass, and 35% of its agricultural land an impossible or dangerous
place to access."81 By contrast, it probably cannot yet be said that
a similar restriction of sovereignty has occurred along the US-
Mexico border, where, despite a spate of cross-border shootings82
and sweeping violations of international human-rights norms, 83
there have been no institutionalized transnational restrictions on
civil rights.
Another important constraint in the above definition is that
the pressures exerted must be physically external. That is, the
forces causing the diminishment of autonomy must be sourced be-
yond the state's borders. This rules out federalist or decentralized
state structures sanctioning autonomous or semiautonomous re-
gions within a state, such as Iraqi Kurdistan or Spanish Catalonia.
It is also what separates buffer zones from the more invasive cat-
egory of foreign occupations, such as Israel's control over the West
Bank or Russia's annexation of Crimea and its "frozen conflicts"
in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.
II. Jus AD BUFFER ZONE: LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BUFFER
ZONES
This Comment has argued that buffer zones are defined by a
diminishment in sovereignty. The voluntariness of that relinquish-
ment of sovereignty has significant legal consequences, resulting
in different justifications for buffer zones depending on whether
they are imposed unilaterally or produced by mutual agreement.
If the latter, there is little legal obstacle from an international-
law standpoint. No article of international law places substantive
81 See Within Range at *9 (cited in note 7).
82 See Report of Thomas Frazier, Perez v United States, Civil Action No 3:13-cv-
01417-WQH, *18-41 (SD Cal filed Feb 29, 2016) ("Frazier Report") (documenting numer-
ous US Border Patrol shootings from 2006 to 2011). See also Andrew Becker, Scathing
Report Deems Fatal Border Patrol Shooting "Highly Predictable" (Reveal, Mar 4, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/J922-73UK (claiming that over forty people have been killed
by the US Border Patrol since 2010).
83 See Denise Gilman, Seeking Breaches in the Wall: An International Human Rights
Law Challenge to the Texas-Mexico Border Wall, 46 Tex Intl L J 257, 275-85 (2011) (doc-
umenting human-rights violations related to the border wall between Texas and Mexico,
including land takings, unequal treatment of property owners, and deprivations of the
indigenous inhabitant's "ability to observe certain traditions," all without "properly ana-
lyz[ing] the need to take property or build the wall").
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limits on a state's treaty power, leaving states free to cede terri-
torial sovereignty by agreement. 84 This has in fact been an inte-
gral feature of treaty practice for millennia.
Conversely, any buffer zone created without the consent of
the territorial sovereign must be defended against the claim that
it is an unlawful "threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence" of the affected state. 8 There are
three (frequently overlapping) available avenues to make this
showing, which this Part takes up in turn: UNSC authorization,
individual or collective self-defense, and humanitarian need.
These doctrines are further limited by background law-of-war
principles accepted as part of customary law, especially immi-
nence, necessity, and proportionality.86 The necessity criterion
has been codified in the UN Charter through the requirement
that force be utilized only as a last resort.87 Proportionality, in its
most authoritative statement, is the related notion that an act
justified by necessity "must be limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it."88
A. UNSC Authorization
The UN is ordinarily restricted from intervening "in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state."89 But this provision makes a carve-out for "enforcement
measures under Chapter VII" of the UN Charter, which deals
with international peacekeeping operations.90 Chapter VII en-
forcement measures begin when the UNSC identifies a "threat to
84 Domestic laws, however, sometimes do limit treaty power with respect to cession.
The issue is especially contentious in federalist regimes because provincial governments
might have a competing claim to land ceded by the federal government. Advocates of
states' rights voiced exactly this concern at the US constitutional convention. See David
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich L Rev 1075, 1132-42 (2000) (documenting con-
cerns raised in discussions at the Philadelphia Convention, within the Federalist Papers,
and at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, regarding the scope of the proposed federal
treaty power, including its perceived impact on future ceded territories).
85 UN Charter Art 2(4).
86 See Amy E. Eckert and Manooher Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire-the First Strike
Doctrine and Preemptive Self-Defense under International Law, 12 Tulane J Intl & Comp
L 117, 128 (2004).
87 See UN Charter Arts 2(3), 33(1).
88 Letter from Daniel Webster, US Secretary of State, to Mr. Fox, British Special
Representative to the United States (Apr 24, 1841), 29 British & Foreign St Papers 1129,
1138 (1857).
89 UN Charter Art 2(7).
90 UN Charter Art 2(7).
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the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."91 When it
does, the UNSC must first attempt to resolve the situation
through nonviolent tactics under Article 41, including the disrup-
tion of communications and of economic and diplomatic rela-
tions.92 Should peaceable means of resolution fail, it is empowered
by Article 42 to pursue military action in order to "maintain or
restore international peace and security."93 In doing so, the UNSC
may delegate enforcement to UN "Blue Helmets," to "Member
States" generally or to specified members, or to designated inter-
national organizations.94
Chapter VII thus enables a spectrum of UNSC responses to
security threats, ranging from social blacklisting to economic
sanctions under Article 41 and from monitoring and peacekeeping
to regime change under Article 42. Both provisions permit dero-
gation from the ordinary inviolability of "territorial integrity
[and] political independence."95 Because buffer zones are often in-
tended to minimize contact between neighboring states, some
might be justified as Article 41 measures for the "interruption of
economic relations and . .. means of communication, and the sev-
erance of diplomatic relations."96 Most, however, would likely be
framed as Article 42 "action by air, sea, or land forces."97 The
choice may be strictly academic-UNSC Chapter VII resolutions
frequently omit reference to the precise article of authority.98
91 UN Charter Art 39.
92 UN Charter Art 41.
93 UN Charter Art 42.
94 Michael N. Schmitt, Wings over Libya: The No-Fly Zone in Legal Perspective, 36
Yale J Intl L Online 45, 48 (2011).
95 UN Charter Art 2(4).
96 UN Charter Art 41.
97 UN Charter Art 42.
98 See Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities *3-4 (Security
Council Report, June 23, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/293X-JV2K (observing that
many prior resolutions included no such reference, although it is now common practice to
include an Article 39 determination and a general claim to be "acting under Chapter VII").
For examples of Chapter VII actions taken without reference to either specific article, see
Resolution 1510, UN Security Council, 4840th mtg (Oct 13, 2003), UN Doc S/RES/1510
(Afghanistan); Resolution 1264, UN Security Council, 4045th mtg (Sept 15, 1999), UN Doc
S/RES/1264 (East Timor); Resolution 794, UN Security Council, 3145th mtg (December 3,
1992), UN Doc S/RES/794 (Somalia); Resolution 770, UN Security Council, 3106th mtg
(Aug 13, 1992), UN Doc S/RES/770 (Bosnia and Herzegovina); Resolution 678, UN Security
Council, 2959th mtg (Nov 27, 1990), UN Doc S/RES/678 27 (Iraq); Resolution 83, UN
Security Council, 474th mtg (June 27, 1950), UN Doc S/RES/83 5 (1950) (North Korea).
But see In Hindsight: Chapter VII *2 (Security Council Report, Sept 30, 2013), archived
at http://perma.ccfH7U6-K3VV ("At times, the Security Council has sought to include a
precise reference to the article on which the measures imposed are based, most frequently
1396 [84:1379
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The UNSC's response to the Gulf War provides a textbook
study of the buffer zone authorization process at work. The UNSC
first condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 199099
and subsequently issued resolutions calling on member states to
boycott Iraqi goodsloo and to embargo its ports.10 ' In November, it
set January 15, 1991, as a deadline for Iraq to withdraw, after
which member states would be authorized "to use all necessary
means" to fulfill its prior resolutions.102 This provided the legal
basis for the aerial, naval, and ground assault that ensued when
Saddam Hussein ignored the deadline. After coalition forces
repelled the Iraqis, the UNSC announced the establishment of a
demilitarized zone103 to be enforced by the United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).104 UNIKOM proceeded
to oversee the withdrawal of armed forces and, after increasing
its strength in response to a few early incidents revolving around
border demarcation, maintained calm along the frontier for the
next decade.105 Its mandate ended in 2003,106 but the buffer zone
persists today and has been reinforced by both sides.107
B. Self-Defense
All provisions of the UN Charter are subject to qualification
by Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
Article 41, to exclude any inference that the Council might be including measures under
Article 42.").
99 Resolution 660, UN Security Council, 2932d mtg (Aug 2, 1990), UN Doc S/RES/660 19.
100 Resolution 661, UN Security Council, 2933d mtg (Aug 6, 1990), UN Doc S/RES/661
19-20.
101 Resolution 665, UN Security Council, 2938th mtg (Aug 25, 1990), UN
Doc/S/RES/665 21-22.
102 Resolution 678, UN Security Council, 2963d mtg (Nov 29, 1990), UN Doc
S/RES/678 27-28.
103 Resolution 687, UN Security Council, 2981st mtg (Apr 3, 1991), UN Doc S/RES/687
11-15.
104 Resolution 689, UN Security Council, 2983d mtg (Apr 9, 1991), UN Doc S/RES/689
15-16.
105 See Iraq /Kuwait-UNKOM-Background (UN, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/
L6LD-QDVG.
106 Resolution 1490, UN Security Council, 4783d mtg (July 3, 2003), UN Doc
S/RES/1490.
107 See Barry A. Feinstein and Justus Reid Weiner, Israel's Security Barrier: An
International Comparative Analysis and Legal Evaluation, 37 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 309,
341 (2005); Justin C. Glon, Note, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors:" National Security
and Terrorism-Time to Fence in Our Southern Border, 15 Ind Intl & Comp L Rev 349,
373 (2005) (describing efforts made by the United Nations Security Council to strengthen
the barrier between Iraq and Kuwait, including an electric fence and a trench).
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attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."108 States have frequently relied
on this clause to support defensive actions taken without UNSC
authorization.109 The unilateral imposition of a buffer zone could
be justified under the same theory. Compared to more indiscrim-
inate forms of warfare, buffer zones will ordinarily more easily
satisfy the necessity and proportionality principles due to their
territorial and operational limitations. But the imminence prong
remains a challenging hurdle to overcome.
Prior to the UN Charter, preventive attacks targeting emerg-
ing threats were condoned by international customary law.110 But
Article 51 appears to have abrogated that practice, requiring that
defensive measures be legitimated by a prior attack ("if an armed
attack occurs"). The UN interprets this to permit preemptive
strikes without UNSC authorization when "the threatened attack
is imminent" but not "preventive military action" in response to
more remote threats."' The ICJ has taken an even more restric-
tive reading of Article 51, refusing to admit the self-defense justi-
fication in the absence of an armed attack and disapproving of
"security needs [that] are essentially preventative."112 The differ-
ence of opinions remains unresolved due to continuing contro-
versy over whether the ICJ has the power of judicial review over
UNSC decisions.113
The forcible imposition of a buffer zone, even for defensive
aims, does not fit with either of these understandings of Article 51
108 UN Charter Art 51.
109 See James A. Green, The Article 51 Reporting Requirement for Self-Defense Ac-
tions, 55 Va J Intl L 563, 575-79 (2015) (logging 200 official Article 51 reports made to the
UNSC over the period 1998-2013 and an estimated 141 general claims of self-defense
made over the same period).
110 See Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure of the United
Nations Collective Security System, 56 Cath U L Rev 871, 922 (2007) (citing the "destruc-
tion of the French fleet at Mers el K6ber" as an example of an action that would have been
considered a lawful anticipatory self-defense before the UN Charter).
111 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, UN Doc A/59/565 63 (2004).
112 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v Uganda), 2005 ICJ 168, 222-23 at ¶1 143, 147.
113 See Mark Angehr, Comment, The International Court of Justice's Advisory Juris-
diction and the Review of Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, 103 Nw U
L Rev 1007, 1025-27 (2009); Kathleen Ren6e Cronin-Furman, Note, The International
Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council: Rethinking a Complicated Re-
lationship, 106 Colum L Rev 435, 444-47 (2006); Michael J. Matheson, ICJ Review of
Security Council Decisions, 36 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 615, 619-22 (2004).
1398 [84:1379
Between Here and There
because it would almost always be preventive rather than
preemptive. However, many contend that Article 51 does allow
for "anticipatory self-defense." One argument is that the term
"inherent right" to self-defense signals a return to the more per-
missive pre-Charter customary law.114 Another possibility is that
the language "if an armed attack occurs" does not necessarily
mean after the attack.115 Most persuasive is the observation that
Article 51 is underpinned by the assumption of an effective UN
collective security apparatus, which history has revealed to be
woefully overoptimistic.116 Noting that the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties nullifies pacts founded on false premises,117
Professor Robert Delahunty has stated that a "treaty that de-
prives a state of the means to protect itself against external
threats to its existence is immoral and void."118 This logic would
support the imposition of a buffer zone as a form of anticipatory
self-defense if it were a necessary and proportionate response to
provocation.
Article 51 famously protects a right not only to individual
self-defense, but to "collective self-defense" as well. From the
identical treatment of individual and collective self-defense in the
UN Charter and other collective defense treaties-such as NATO,
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Arab
League-it may be inferred that a right to anticipatory individual
self-defense implies an equal right to anticipatory collective self-
defense.119 The principle of necessity, of course, continues to apply
to the notion of collective self-defense,120 preventing it from de-
volving into an easy justification for naked expansionism. Should
the United States go forward with its plan to install a buffer zone
in Syria in order to thwart the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), it would likely do so on the basis of Article 51's protections
114 See David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United
States and Other Views, 1 Duke J Comp & Intl L 57, 81 (1991).
115 Delahunty, 56 Cath U L Rev at 918 (cited in note 110), citing C.H.M. Waldock, The
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Recueil des
Cours 451, 497 (1952).
116 See Delahunty, 56 Cath U L Rev at 940-43 (cited in note 110).
117 See id at 942-43.
118 Id at 942.
119 See George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era:
What the Treaties Have Said, 31 Cornell Intl L J 321, 369-70 (1998).
120 See id at 370.
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of both individual and collective self-defense, citing Syria's inabil-
ity to defend itself and its own vulnerability to attack.121
While ISIS's actions clearly would qualify as forms of "armed
attack," other cases are less straightforward. There has been de-
bate over whether economic, psychological, or cyber warfare fall
under this heading.122 This debate is probably not relevant to the
context of buffer zones, as their purely territorial dimension
makes them an unsuitable response to these complex modes of
warfare. A related issue of greater concern is the appropriate
nexus between the attack and the response. Most scholars read
some immediacy into Article 51, meaning that an attack a decade
ago would not justify the imposition of a buffer zone today.123 On
the other hand, if "the threat or the attack in question consisted
of a number of successive acts, and there is sufficient reason to
expect a continuation of acts from the same source," it would
make sense to account for those acts in the aggregate when con-
sidering the immediacy prong.124
A final issue arises when the armed attack is perpetrated by
a nonstate actor. The ICJ has interpreted Article 51 very nar-
rowly in this respect, finding that it covers only attacks "by one
State against another State."125 This is at odds with a number of
UNSC resolutions implicitly affirming that "large-scale attacks
by non-State actors can qualify as 'armed attacks' within the
meaning of Article 51."126 Without definitive resolution of this
issue, the legal status of buffer zones justified as responses to ter-
ror activity, an increasingly common usage, remains uncertain.
Even if attacks by nonstate actors were considered to implicate
Article 51, a buffer zone might not be a proportionate response
because it impacts combatants and civilians indiscriminately.
121 See Ashley Deeks, A "Buffer Zone" inside Syria, and Its Complications (Lawfare,
Dec 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8E6A-KVG7 (adding that the United States could
also invoke humanitarian justifications for a buffer zone in Syria depending upon its
objectives).
122 See Delahunty, 56 Cath U L Rev at 923-24 (cited in note 110); Priyanka R. Dev,
Note, "Use of Force" and "Armed Attack" Thresholds in Cyber Conflict: The Looming Defi-
nitional Gaps and the Growing Need for Formal U.N. Response, 50 Tex Intl L J 381, 395-
97 (2015).
123 See Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence under International Law, 19 Am
U Intl L Rev 69, 104 (2003).
124 Id.
125 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, 2004 ICJ 131, 194 at ¶ 139 (advisory opinion).
126 Delahunty, 56 Cath U L Rev at 877 (cited in note 110), quoting Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 ICJ at 337 at ¶ 11 (separate opinion of Simma).
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Turkey's expanding buffer zone in Syria represents an arche-
typal articulation of the self-defense justification, motivated
chiefly by its twin desires to dam the flood of migration and to
clear its borders of ISIS and Kurdish militiamen.127 While the in-
flux of immigrants pouring across its borders is not an "armed
attack" that would implicate Article 51, repeated terrorist acts
perpetrated by ISIS and Kurdish separatists clearly qualify.
Turkey could also conceivably argue that its buffer zone is a col-
lective self-defense measure protecting the rest of Europe from
similar incursions. It therefore appears that, despite misgivings
about its true motives,128 Turkey has a strong self-defense justifi-
cation for its Operation Euphrates Shield, although the caveat
mentioned above applies because the threat it faces comes from
nonstate actors. Turkey has also rationalized its Syrian buffer
zone as a humanitarian aid operation,129 illustrating how various
justifications can be utilized in tandem.
C. Humanitarian Intervention
Humanitarian interventionism remains a developing field of
international law. Since the close of the Cold War, the UNSC has
made use of its military powers "to intervene in situations of ex-
treme human suffering, even when contained within one state's
borders."130 Though the UN Charter does not specifically grant an
exception to the rule of national sovereignty for this type of action
like it does for self-defense, humanitarian interventionism has
evolved toward a customary norm that operates in the back-
ground of the Charter.131 In 2001, the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty first developed the related
127 See Orhan Coskun and Ercan Gurses, With Syria 'Safe Zone' Plan, Turkey Faces
Diplomatic Balancing Act (Reuters, Sept 6, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/PLB5-V2H2
(discussing the Turkish government's search for international support in creating a buffer
zone "with the dual aim of clearing its border of Islamic State and Kurdish militia fighters
and of stemming a wave of migration that has caused tensions with Europe"); Tim Arango
and Ceylan Yeginsu, Turkey Seeks Buffer Zone on the Border with Syria (NY Times, Oct
9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9CLY-G6NQ (challenging the humanitarian justifi-
cations for this scheme and commenting that a "buffer zone would quickly evolve into a
place where moderate rebels would be trained to fight" the Syrian government).
128 See note 35 and accompanying text.
129 See Nissenbaum, Turkey's Push to Expand Safe Zone (cited in note 52) (describing
the Turkish President's plan "to transform a vast stretch of northern Syria into a haven
for people fleeing the violence").
130 Matthew C. Cooper, A Note to States Defending Humanitarian Intervention: Ex-
amining Viable Arguments before the International Court of Justice, 40 Denv J Intl L &
Pol 167, 174-75 (2012).
131 See id at 171-73.
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concept of "responsibility to protect,"132 the notion that implicit in
the principle of sovereignty is a duty of the state to guarantee the
safety of its citizens.133 There is widespread agreement that hu-
manitarian intervention may be justified on these grounds based
on an evaluation of five conditions:
(1) the necessity criterion, whether there was genocide or
gross, persistent, and systematic violations of basic human
rights; (2) the proportionality criterion, the duration and pro-
priety of the force applied; (3) the purpose criterion, whether
the intervention was motivated by humanitarian considera-
tion, self-interest, or mixed motivations; (4) whether the action
was collective or unilateral; and (5) whether the intervention
maximized the best outcome. 134
Responding to a UNSC resolution welcoming the engagement
of "a temporary operation under national command" to protect
civilians on the ground,135 France justified the "safe zones" it
installed in Rwanda on a humanitarian basis.136 The UNSC rubber-
stamp of this operation again showcases the interaction between
the multiple justifications for breaching national sovereignty.137
The necessity criterion was easily satisfied in this case given the
stated goal of averting a recognized genocide. France's operation
was limited in scope, duration, and use of force,138 seemingly sat-
isfying the proportionality bar. Nonetheless, France's previous
military support of the Hutu regime led to pervasive skepticism
over its motives at the time.139 A particularly damning report by
132 Carsten Stahn, Note and Comment, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or
Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 Am J Intl L 99, 99 (2007).
133 See id at 118.
134 Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F. Muther Jr, and Amy E. Eckert, Tragedies in Somalia,
Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Inter-
vention under International Law-Part II, 26 Denv J Intl L & Pol 827, 827-28 (1998).
135 Resolution 929, UN Security Council, 3392d mtg (June 22, 1994), UN Doc
S/RES/929 2.
136 Nanda, Muther, and Eckert, 26 Denv J Intl L & Pol at 851 (cited in note 134).
137 It is less clear whether unauthorized unilateral humanitarian intervention is ac-
cepted, though it has been argued that it too represents an emerging customary norm. See
Petr Valek, Note, Is Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Compatible with the U.N.
Charter?, 26 Mich J Intl L 1223, 1230-31 (2005).
138 See Kimberly D. Barnes, Note, International Law, the United Nations, and Inter-
vention in Civil Conflicts, 19 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev 117, 141 (1995).
139 See Paul Schmitt, Note, The Future of Genocide Suits at the International Court of
Justice: France's Role in Rwanda and Implications of the Bosnia v. Serbia Decision, 40
Georgetown J Intl L 585, 603 (2009) ("Given its historical relationship with the Hutu
government, France was possibly the worst choice to stage a significant intervention in
Rwanda."); Nanda, Muther, and Eckert, 26 Denv J Intl L & Pol at 851 (cited in note 134)
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the Rwandan government accused France of outright complicity
in the genocide and called for prosecutions of French officials in
Rwandan courts.140 In retrospect, French intervention debatably
"allowed many Hutu perpetrators to either escape . . . or reestab-
lish themselves in safe zones."141 Thus, while a foreign-imposed
humanitarian buffer zone in Rwanda may have been a legally
appropriate measure, it is doubtful whether France was norma-
tively the best party to undertake it.142 On the other hand, France
deserves credit for taking action while the rest of the community
of nations stood by.
UNSC resolutions, individual or collective self-defense imper-
atives, and humanitarian need have all been invoked to justify
the creation of buffer zones, often in combination with each other.
UNSC endorsement remains the most legitimate and rule-bound
means of the three, representing the explicit approval of the in-
ternational community. Conversely, the buffer zones fQrged by
Turkey and France demonstrate the malleability of the self-
defense and humanitarian justifications. While technically on
solid legal footing from a jus ad buffer zone perspective, these
interventions nonetheless raise cause for suspicion and call for
careful scrutiny, amplifying the urgency of a thorough exposition
of the law within buffer zones.
III. JUS IN BUFFER ZONE: THE LAW OF BUFFER ZONES
Whether or not the existence of a buffer zone is legally justi-
fied, international law still governs its operation. If applicable,
the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocol, which set
the ground rules for armed conflict, would form the basis of that
law. Part III begins with an argument that the Conventions do in
fact apply to buffer zones. It then examines the consequences of
that conclusion for the restriction of civil liberties, destruction of
property, and use of force in buffer zones.
(noting "widespread skepticism that the French were not impartial and were in fact sup-
porting the Hutus").
140 See Schmitt, Note, 40 Georgetown J Intl L at 585-86 (cited in note 139).
141 Id at 590.
142 See id at 601.
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A. Applicability of the Geneva Conventions
At first glance, the applicability of the Conventions to buffer
zones might be taken as a given-the texts specifically contem-
plate the establishment, by formal accord, of "demilitarized
zones,"143 "hospital and safety zones,"144 and "neutralized zones
intended to shelter" civilians and incapacitated combatants.145
But as noted in Part I, there are stark differences between the
meaning of these terms in the Conventions and the definition of
buffer zones used by this Comment. First, buffer zones are not al-
ways the product of mutual agreement. Second, the Conventions
do not neatly map onto the concept of buffer zones because they
do not anticipate the continuation of simmering hostilities outside
of traditional wars or after the formal termination of armed
conflict. Like the inadequacy of its response to the emergence of
nonstate armed groups,1 46 international law's binary war-and-
peace framework represents another failure to adapt to the evo-
lution of modern warfare and statecraft. As Professor Carsten
Stahn observes, "the protracted nature of modern conflicts and
the involvement of potentially numerous armed groups and fac-
tions make it often difficult to determine a definitive point in time
at which the laws of war cease to operate."147 Occupied primarily
by jus ad bellum and jus in bello concerns,148 the Conventions
assume an identifiable end to war (and to buffer zones) and
consequently exhibit little regard for "jus post bellum" (save for
the law of occupation).
Nonetheless, persuasive evidence that the Conventions do
hold in buffer zones is found in their general applicability to
(a) "all cases of declared war"; (b) "any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them"; and
(c) "all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance."149 There are a number of ways in which buffer
143 Protocol I Art 60, 1125 UNTS at 30.
144 Convention IV Art 14, 1955 6 UST at 3528.
145 Convention IV Art 15, 1955 6 UST at 3528.
146 See text accompanying notes 111-12.
147 Carsten Stahn, "Jus ad Bellum", "Jus in Bello". . . "Jus post Bellum"?-Rethinking
the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17 Eur J Intl L 921, 927 n 32 (2006).
148 See id at 927-29.
149 Convention IV Art 2, 1955 6 UST at 3518.
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zones might match these categorizations. Some buffer zones, par-
ticularly externally imposed "shoot on sight" zones, are them-
selves active war zones, where deadly force is routinely employed.
Others, especially mutually accepted buffer zones created
through armistice agreements, divide states that arguably re-
main in a condition of "declared war." North and South Korea, for
example, are popularly depicted as remaining "technically at
war," though the accuracy of that statement is suspect. 50 At the
least, an intermediate status mixtus, "in which the laws of war
might apply during peacetime," is said to prevail in the Korean
demilitarized zone and likely in other buffer zones as well.151
Given the frequency of violence within some buffer zones and
their general volatility, many might still be viewed as sites of con-
tinuing "armed conflict" long after the initial conflict that precip-
itated their installation, especially considering that "[i]nterna-
tional humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a
general conclusion of peace is reached."152 There is no single
international-law definition for armed conflict, but it has been
characterized to involve at a minimum "[t]he existence of orga-
nized armed groups ... [e]ngaged in fighting of some intensity."153
It must continue long enough to allow for distinction from
"incidents[,] border clashes[,] internal disturbances and tensions[,]
... civil unrest, and single acts of terrorism."154 Both imposed
buffer zones maintained by systematic force and mutually ac-
cepted buffer zones drawn by armistice agreements seem to qual-
ify as armed conflicts under this gloss.
Unilaterally imposed buffer zones might also be thought of as
forms of partial occupation. A territory is deemed "occupied"
under international law when foreign military authority over it
"has been established and can be exercised.""5 In the same sense,
externally imposed and enforced buffer zones, including virtually
150 Nam, 8 E Asia L Rev at 46-47 (cited in note 44) (expressing ambiguity as to
whether the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953 terminated the war).
151 Id at 65, 67-70.
152 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor
v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1, 1 70 (Intl Crim Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Oct 2, 1995).
153 Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law *2 (Intl Law
Association, Hague Conference, 2010), archived at http://perma.ce/4LE9-G54X.
154 Id at *28 (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted).
155 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Art 42, 36 Stat
2277, 2306, Treaty Ser No 539 (1907) ("Hague IV").
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every humanitarian buffer zone, effectively result in the non-
consensual transfer of territorial control to a foreign entity. Ab-
stracting from the phrase "can be exercised," several interna-
tional tribunals have found occupations to exist so long as there
is the potential for foreign exertion of authority, even without an
actual foreign military presence. 156 The inquiry has been phrased
as whether external forces have "substituted their own authority
for that of the [local] [g]overnment"17 or "could at any time they
desired assume physical control."18 By these measures, "no-go
zones" or "shoot-on-sight zones" resemble occupations governed
by the Conventions. The Fourth Geneva Convention features an
entire section detailing the responsibilities of occupying powers.15 9
To the extent that buffer zones do qualify as sites of declared
war, armed conflict, or occupation, the application of the Geneva
Conventions problematizes a number of common practices within
them related to the treatment of civilians. Only under highly
circumscribed circumstances do the Conventions permit the
restriction of civilian rights, the destruction of civilian property,
and the use of force against civilians. The next sections consider
whether these types of state assertions of force are Geneva-
compliant in the buffer zone context.
B. Rights Violations
The Geneva Conventions are founded on the principle of dis-
tinction "between the civilian population and combatants and be-
tween civilian objects and military objectives."160 At minimum,
they guarantee respect for "the person, honour, convictions and
religious practices" of all victims of international armed con-
flicts.161 This includes the right to leave the territory,12 criminal
due process protections,163 and prohibitions against collective pun-
ishment.164 Even were the Conventions not implicated, re-
strictions of these rights would still be subject to review under
156 See Solon Solomon, Occupied or Not: The Question of Gaza's Legal Status after the
Israeli Disengagement, 19 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 59, 71-73 (2011).
157 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 ICJ 230 at ¶ 173.
158 United States v List, 8 Law Rep Trials War Criminals 34, 56 (US Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg 1948).
159 See Convention IV Arts 47-78, 1955 6 UST at 3548-68.
160 Protocol I Art 48, 1125 UNTS at 25.
161 Protocol I Art 75(1), 1125 UNTS at 37.
162 Convention IV Art 35, 1955 6 UST at 3540.
163 See Convention IV Arts 72-73, 1955 6 UST at 3563-64.
164 Protocol I Art 75(2)(d), 1125 UNTS at 37.
1406 [84:1379
Between Here and There
international human-rights standards, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights65 (ICCPR) and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights166
(ICESCR). Among the basic rights that these treaty bodies protect
are the rights to suffrage,17 privacy,168 and liberty of person16 9 and
movement.1 70 They apply universally to all state parties, though
they may be abrogated in times of emergency.1 71
The Geneva Conventions also include provisions protecting
private property and essential infrastructure against interference
unless pursuant to military necessity. "Civilian objects" may not
be harmed unless they qualify as "military objectives"-that is,
targets "which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization ... offers a definite military
advantage."172 Similar contingencies are placed on the destruction
of "foodstuffs, agricultural areas . . . , crops, livestock, drinking
water installations and supplies and irrigation works" (provided
that such actions would not cause starvation).173 The language
"definite military advantage" has been interpreted to mean that
"it is not legitimate to launch an attack which offers only potential
or indeterminate advantages."174 Cases of doubt are resolved in
favor of military restraint.175 In occupations, the destruction of
property is further constrained to instances in which it is "ren-
dered absolutely necessary by military operations."176 Meanwhile,
the Hague Conventions unequivocally prohibit the confiscation of
private property.177
165 999 UNTS 171 (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Mar 23, 1976).
166 993 UNTS 3 (Dec 16, 1966, entered into force Jan 3, 1976).
167 ICCPR Art 25(b), 999 UNTS at 179.
168 ICCPR Art 17, 999 UNTS at 177.
169 ICCPR Art 9, 999 UNTS at 175-76.
170 ICCPR Art 12, 999 UNTS at 176.
171 ICCPR Art 4, 999 UNTS at 174.
172 Protocol I Art 52(2), 1125 UNTS at 27. See also Hague IV Art 23(g), 36 Stat at
2302 (outlawing the destruction or seizure of enemy property unless "imperatively de-
manded by the necessities of war").
173 Protocol I Art 54(1)-(3), 1125 UNTS at 27 (outlining protections for objects neces-
sary to the "survival of the civilian population").
174 Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols
¶ 2024 at 636 (cited in note 41).
175 Protocol I Art 52(3), 1125 UNTS at 27.
176 Convention IV Art 53, 1955 6 UST at 3552.
177 Hague IV Art 46, 36 Stat at 2306-07.
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1. Civil rights.
As noted previously, restrictions on rights within a buffer
zone, beginning with restrictions on access, exist on a spectrum.
Whereas exclusionary buffer zones deny entry to everyone, demil-
itarized buffer zones grant admission to noncombatants. Even in
demilitarized buffer zones, however, the rights of civilians are
often severely curtailed, particularly with respect to freedom of
movement. Villagers on the South Korean side of the DMZ "en-
dure countless checkpoints" and live under a curfew.178 While the
right to freedom of movement is not categorical, it may be dero-
gated under the ICCPR only "[i]n time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation" and solely "to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation."179 In a case analogous
to buffer zones, the ICJ invoked the ICCPR to condemn Israeli
restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement along its West
Bank barrier.180 States establishing buffer zones must therefore
ensure that they proceed by the least restrictive means available.
In other places, civil rights restrictions extend further. The
remaining residents of Ukraine's buffer zone complain of dis-
franchisement, forced quartering of soldiers, and neglect in the
provision of basic government services, all while stationed on the
frontlines and bearing the brunt of the casualties.181 To promote a
rebel-held buffer zone in Angola in the early 1980s, South African
troops sabotaged local food distribution, drove away cattle, and
poisoned wells.182 While clearly violating the conditional ICCPR
rights to privacy and suffrage, these abuses appear to be forms of
"collective punishment" disallowed by the Conventions, a term
used "in the broadest sense. .. cover[ing] not only legal sentences
but [also] sanctions and harassment of any sort."183
2. Property rights.
In addition to infringing civil rights, states have routinely
discarded private property rights for the sake of inaugurating and
178 Norimitsu Onishi, Taesung Village Journal; In a DMZ That Bristles Less, the Vil-
lagers Are at Home (NY Times, Aug 3, 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/VE34-E59L.
179 ICCPR Art 4, 999 UNTS at 174.
180 See Construction of a Wall, 2004 ICJ 189-95 at ¶1 132-42.
181 See Amie Ferris-Rotman, Life in Ukraine's Buffer Zone (Politico, Dec 6, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.c/RK4F-CTVX.
182 See Ross, S. Africa Seeking a Buffer Zone (cited in note 33).
183 Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols
? 3055 at 874 (cited in note 41).
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maintaining a buffer zone. As described in the Introduction,
Israel has leveled terrain and sprayed herbicides to destroy
Palestinian farmland within its announced buffer zone.184 Simi-
larly, Egypt has flattened thousands of homes within its own ter-
ritory to create a buffer zone with Gaza.185 Egypt and Israel
rationalized their drastic actions as military necessities in order
to prevent smuggling and terror attacks. In Egypt's case, media
outlets and human-rights monitors openly questioned this assess-
ment. 186 Elsewhere, Israel's argument that land requisitions are
a necessary and proportionate response to the deaths and injuries
caused by terrorism has fallen flat. In an advisory opinion con-
cerning Israel's construction of a security barrier in the West
Bank, the ICJ condemned Israel's destruction and confiscation of
agricultural land, deciding (in rather conclusory fashion) that it
was not "rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."187
These cases demonstrate the difficulty of meeting the necessity
bar in order to justify property demolition as a security measure.
C. Use of Force
In assessing the legality of applications of force within buffer
zones, the central inquiry revolves around distinguishing civil-
ians from militants. The Conventions categorically forbid indis-
criminate attacks against civilians,188 whom they define as all
people other than the armed forces, militias, or spontaneous
assailants.189 However, analogy to the analytically similar cate-
gory of no-fly zones suggests that definition may be broadened in
buffer zones created pursuant to UNSC authorization. For no-fly
zones established by states without UNSC backing, the rules of
engagement remain the same as outside the zone,1 90 including the
basic law-of-war principles of distinction, precaution, and propor-
tionality embodied in the Conventions.191 But some scholars have
184 See Aldabbour, Israel Spraying Toxins (cited in note 1).
185 See Egypt Demolishes Thousands of Homes (cited in note 64). Although the Egyptian
buffer zone is intrastate, the Geneva Conventions would still apply to the extent that the
Egypt-Gaza border remains a site of armed conflict. Certainly the ICCPR and ICESCR
apply, as always.
186 See, for example, "Look for Another Homeland": Forced Evictions in Egypt's Rafah
(Human Rights Watch, Sept 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KQF6-VW3U.
187 Construction of a Wall, 2004 ICJ 189-92 at ¶¶ 132-35.
188 Protocol I Art 51, 1125 UNTS at 26.
189 See Protocol I Art 50, 1125 UNTS at 26.
190 Protocol I Art 51, 1125 UNTS at 26.
191 See Protocol I Art 48, 1125 UNTS at 25 (defining distinction as the obligation
on parties to "at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants");
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taken the position that civilian aircraft violating a UNSC-
sanctioned no-fly zone forfeit their civilian status and themselves
become valid military objectives.192 If civilians breaching the zone
are not treated as "direct participants in hostilities, who may be
attacked 'for such time' as they so participate," it is argued, en-
forcement becomes nearly impossible.193 The same might be said
of UNSC-blessed exclusionary buffer zones, which become mean-
ingless if civilians are allowed to violate them with impunity.
Regardless of whether a civilian entering a buffer zone can
become a military target, the necessity and proportionality prin-
ciples require attempts at contact, visual identification, and di-
version prior to the application of force.194 All precautions, how-
ever, are subject to the caveat of feasibility,195 defined as measures
that are "practicable or practically possible, taking into account
all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and
military considerations."196
Between nations that have formally embraced "shoot on
sight" policies197 and those otherwise strictly enforcing buffer
zones, illegal uses of force have become common occurrences in
many buffer zones. The Korean DMZ is one site of frequent
clashes, often triggered by fears of defection.198 In the infamous
"axe-murder incident," two UN guards were killed in the Korean
DMZ after venturing out to cut down a tree. 199 Disputed reports of
Protocol I Art 51(5)(b), 1125 UNTS at 26 (taking proportionality to forbid "an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated"); Protocol I Art 57, 1125 UNTS at 29
(requiring that all "feasible" precautions, including advance warning, be taken with re-
spect to the method and target of an attack to prevent civilian casualties).
192 Schmitt, 36 Yale J Intl L Online at 51-53 (cited in note 94).
193 Id at 52, citing Protocol I Art 51(3), 1125 UNTS at 26.
194 See Schmitt, 36 Yale J Intl L Online at 52 (cited in note 94). See also Protocol I
Arts 57-58, 1125 UNTS at 29.
195 See Schmitt, 36 Yale J Intl L Online at 53-54 (cited in note 94).
196 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices Art 3(10), 2048 UNTS 93, 136 (Oct 10, 1980, as amended on May 3, 1996,
entered into force Dec 3, 1998) ("Protocol II).
197 See note 69.
198 See, for example, Jung-yoon Choi, South Korean Troops Shoot, Kill Man Trying to
Cross to North Korea (LA Times, Sept 16, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/J62N-YC2V;
Clyde Haberman, 3 Koreans Killed as Soldiers Trade Shots in the DMZ (NY Times, Nov
24, 1984), archived at http://perma.cc/UY22-7G3N.
199 See Morse Tan, International Humanitarian Law and North Korea: Another Angle
for Accountability, 98 Marq L Rev 1147, 1150 (2015); Association for Diplomatic Studies
and Training, The Bizarre North Korean Axe Murders (Huffington Post), archived at
http://perma.cc/4GPF-C4TL.
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Russian agents abducting Ukrainian citizens in the buffer zone200
likewise run afoul of the Conventions' requirement that attacks
be directed only at specific military objectives.201 Israel, mean-
while, has shot and killed dozens of Palestinians that have
breached its no-go zone in Gaza and wounded hundreds more in
alleged furtherance of its national defense.202 Even assuming the
legality of the no-go zone, the legality of these applications of force
appears highly suspect. While Israel routinely takes precautionary
measures that distinguish its approach from "shoot on sight,"
such as distributing leaflets cautioning Gazans not to approach
the border area 203 and customarily first firing a warning shot
toward intruders identified as civilians ("incriminated" targets
receive no such courtesy),04 the sheer volume of shootings casts
doubt on its good-faith adherence to the distinction doctrine.
D. Assumption of Responsibility in Humanitarian Buffer Zones
Apart from negative injunctions against unnecessarily invad-
ing on civilian rights or taking military action against civilians,
there is also the possibility that states installing humanitarian
buffer zones owe an affirmative obligation to affected civilians.
Calls for heightened accountability in foreign interventions gath-
ered momentum in the wake of the massacre at Srebrenica, a
UNSC-protected "safe area" that was overrun by Serbian nation-
alists who proceeded to eliminate the city's Muslim population.201
International humanitarian law treats intervening powers the
same as occupying powers, 206 imposing a responsibility to "take all
the measures in [their] power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety."207 Though admitting that "[t]he
idea of legal responsibility for damage caused even by the justified
200 See Masha Gessen, Nadiya Savchenko Gives Russia the Finger (New Yorker, Mar
10, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/GH6N-P9HA.
201 Protocol I Art 51(4)(a), 1125 UNTS at 26.
202 See Within Range at *6 (cited in note 7).
203 See id at *11.
204 See id at *19.
205 Mohamed S. Elewa, Genocide at the Safe Area of Srebrenica: A Search for a New
Strategy for Protecting Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 10 Mich St U Det Coll
L J Intl L 429, 429-34 (2001) (summarizing the history of this protected zone and evalu-
ating it within the context of demilitarized zones generally).
206 See Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, Democracy and the Re-
sidual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11 UC Davis J Intl L & Pol 23, 26-
27 (2004).
207 Hague IV Art 43, 36 Stat at 2306.
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use of force is rather novel,"208 Professor Bartram Brown has ad-
vocated for "some standard of reasonable care" in humanitarian
intervention.209 The legal hook for such an innovation might be
the Martens clause of the Hague Conventions, which guarantees
"the protection and empire of the principles of international law,
as they result from the usages established between civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the
public conscience."210 This provision introduces the potential for a
gradual evolution of the law of armed conflict, potentially allow-
ing for an extension of the responsibility to protect from states
and occupiers to humanitarian interventionists. The imposition
of a humanitarian buffer zone might be treated as a similar as-
sumption of responsibility that bears a duty of care.
The Geneva Conventions and other canonical codes of interna-
tional law protecting the rights of civilians provide a framework for
the law of buffer zones. While some curbs on civil liberties may be
inevitable byproducts, these treaty bodies demand that such
restrictions are as minimal as possible. By codifying the law-of-
war principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality, they
require extreme care in the application of force toward civilians
or their property.
IV. BUFFER ZONES AS TAKINGS
An inescapable critique of international humanitarian law is
the lack of a permanent enforcement mechanism. While the
Conventions cover a vast range of abuses, their enforcement is re-
liant on national legislation and prosecution of "grave breaches,"211
"Protecting Powers" acting as observers and referees,212 fact-
finding commissions,213 ad hoc international criminal tribunals
(such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda)
208 Brown, 11 UC Davis J Intl L & Pol at 50 (cited in note 206).
209 Id at 72-73.
210 Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Preamble, 32 Stat 1803, 1803-08, Treaty Ser No 403 (1899).
211 Convention IV Art 146, 1955 6 UST at 3616 ("The High Contracting Parties
undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for per-
sons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention.").
212 Convention IV Art 9, 1955 6 UST at 3524.
213 Protocol I Art 90, 1125 UNTS at 43-44.
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with strictly circumscribed jurisdiction,214 or the oft-maligned
International Criminal Court (ICC).215 None of these methods has
proven particularly effective,216 leaving civilians adversely af-
fected by a buffer zone with no obvious judicial remedy under in-
ternational humanitarian law. With this obstacle in mind, this
Comment now considers whether there might be an alternative
path to the vindication of civilian rights in buffer zones: takings.
Ordinarily, the state must offer compensation when it effects
a taking by interfering with the usage of private property or act-
ing to severely reduce its value.217 Citizens living in buffer zones
created by their own state thus may hold cognizable domestic-law
claims against their government. The plight of Cypriots and
Egyptians displaced by exclusionary buffer zones or of Koreans
and Ukrainians living under onerous restrictions in demilitarized
buffer zones come to mind. Even when a country has a well-
developed law of eminent domain and regulatory takings, how-
ever, there may be exceptions in cases of military necessity.218
While the success of these claims depends on the particulari-
ties of national legal regimes, a taking accomplished by a foreign
state, or a domestic taking attributable to pressure exerted by a
foreign state, is a matter of international law due to the sover-
eignty implications.219 Culled primarily from the context of
foreign-investment dispute arbitration, there is a rich body of
international takings jurisprudence, encompassing both direct
expropriations (nationalizing private enterprises) and indirect
214 Christine Byron, A Blurring of the Boundaries: The Application of International
Humanitarian Law by Human Rights Bodies, 47 Va J Intl L 839, 846 (2007).
215 Id. For an assessment of common critiques of the ICC, see Carsten Stahn, How Fair
Are Criticisms of the ICC? (Oxford, Nov 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K8YG-MNBB.
216 See Byron, 47 Va J Intl L at 846-47 (cited in note 214).
217 See Barry Appleton, Regulatory Takings: The International Law Perspective, 11
NYU Envtl L J 35, 42 (2002), citing North American Free Trade Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United Mexican States Art 1100, 32 ILM 612, 641-42 (1993) (outlining the proper
methods of "[e]xpropriation and [clompensation").
218 See, for example, El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co v United States, 55 Fed
Cl 751, 764 (2003) ("We conclude from these cases that the [Takings] [Cilause applies to
the civil functions of Government and not to the military.").
219 See Mark A. Chinen, The Standard of Compensation for Takings, 25 Minn J Intl
L 335, 340 (2016) (discussing the sovereignty concerns of a state over the takings claims
for land within its borders).
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expropriations (regulatory takings).22 Although the basic princi-
ples are widely shared,221 there is substantial variation in the
conceptualization of takings across the three thousand foreign-
investment treaties and myriad arbitral institutions adjudicating
them.222 The result is a muddled and divergent body of law, par-
ticularly when it comes to the line between indirect expropriation
and ordinary, noncompensable economic regulation.223 There is lit-
tle doubt, however, that customary international law recognizes
the basic validity of takings claims under prescribed conditions.
Extending this jurisprudence to the context of buffer zones is
a novel maneuver but one that fits with the doctrine. It would
enable a civilian adversely impacted by the continuance of a
buffer zone to pursue a takings theory before an international
body such as the ICJ, a regional human-rights court, or a bilateral
tribunal. This Part begins by considering which types of activities
within buffer zones might qualify as takings under international
law, finding important distinctions for this analysis between
exclusionary and demilitarized buffer zones. It then discusses
whether these takings can be legal and what remedies might exist
for injured parties.
A. Externally Imposed Buffer Zones as Takings: Exclusionary
versus Demilitarized
As in American law, a taking in international law may be
accomplished directly, through a confiscation of property, or indi-
rectly, through a limitation on the property's usage or productiv-
ity.224 The difference between direct and indirect expropriations
220 See Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and Interna-
tional Investment Law, 36 U Pa J Intl L 1, 5, 38-39 (2014).
221 See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the
Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 Am J Intl L 475, 481-84 (2008).
222 See Mojtaba Dani and Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, The Uncertainty of Legal Doctrine
in Indirect Expropriation Cases and the Legitimacy Problems of Investment Arbitration,
22 Widener L Rev 1, 2 (2016).
223 Ratner, 102 Am J Intl L at 481-84 (cited in note 221).
224 See Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens § B, Art 10(3)(a) at 104 (Harvard 1961) (defining a taking as
"not only an outright taking of property but also any such unreasonable interference ...
that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within a
reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference"). See also OECD Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 2 Intl Law 331, Art 3 at 337 (1968) ("No
Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his property a national
of another Party.").
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corresponds to the distinction between exclusionary and demili-
tarized buffer zones. An exclusionary buffer zone amounts to a
direct expropriation, or "an outright taking of property" for which
international takings law incontrovertibly requires compensa-
tion.2253 By contrast, demilitarized buffer zones, in which civilians
retain usage of the land under added restrictions, are akin to in-
direct expropriations, which merit compensation as a taking only
under certain conditions.226 International courts and tribunals
have innovated a variety of methods to draw the line between reg-
ulatory takings and noncompensable exercises of police powers.
The most common approach to this inquiry is the "sole-effect
test," which examines only the degree of deprivation (usually in eco-
nomic terms).227 This standard derives from the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), which, after some early indecision,
announced that "a government's liability to compensate for expro-
priation of alien property does not depend on proof that the
expropriation was intentional."228 Panels applying this test focus
primarily on changes in the property's value or the locus of con-
trol.229 By excluding governmental intent from the analysis and
focusing solely on the investor's loss, this test is thought to favor
investors. 230 A sole-effects taking occurs when "the property has
been rendered virtually valueless" or the owner is unable "to man-
age or dispose of' it.231 Thus, the IUSCT found a taking had
occurred when Iran nationalized its oil industry and repudiated a
contract with an American petroleum company, noting that "[t]he
intent of the government is less important than the effects of the
measures on the owner."232 However, a separate tribunal reached
the opposite outcome in regards to an Argentinian emergency reg-
ulation that disappointed American investment expectations,
commenting that "[a] finding of indirect expropriation would
225 See Harvard Law School, Draft Convention § B, Art 10(3)(a) at 104 (cited in note 224).
226 See Wagner, 36 U Pa J Intl L at 39 (cited in note 220).
227 Dani and Akhtar-Khavari, 22 Widener L Rev at 6-7 (cited in note 222).
228 Maurizio Brunetti, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, NAFTA Chapter 11,
and the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation, 2 Chi J Intl L 203, 207 (2001), quoting Phillips
Petroleum Co Iran v Iran, 21 Iran-US Cl Tribunal Rep 79, 115 at ¶ 98 (1989).
229 See Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/02/16, 84 at
¶ 285 (2007).
230 See Dani and Akhtar-Khavari, 22 Widener L Rev at 30 (cited in note 222).
231 Wayne Mapp, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: The First Ten Years,
1981-1991 155 (Manchester 1993).
232 Phillips Petroleum, 21 Iran-US Cl Tribunal Rep 115 at ¶ 97, quoting Tippetts,
Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 6 Iran-US Cl
Tribunal Rep 219, 225-26 (1984).
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require ... that the investor no longer be in control of its business
operation, or that the value of the business have been virtually
annihilated."233
By contrast, various tribunals have adopted a version of the
''purpose test," based on the "accepted principle of international
law that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a conse-
quence of bona fide 'regulation' within the accepted police power
of states."234 This formulation redirects the inquiry toward the
state's intent, checking that the state's action is deliberate, in
service of the public interest, and not motivated by animus or self-
aggrandizement.235 The 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, for example, decrees that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances,
non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such
as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriations."236 Applying this text, a NAFTA tribunal
ruled that California had not committed a taking of a Canadian
methanol company by enacting a new ban on a certain gasoline
additive, holding that "as a matter of general international law, a
non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose .. . which af-
fects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had
been given."237
A third option, pioneered by the European Court of Human
Rights, is a "conciliatory approach" that weighs the public and
private interests in concert, walking a middle ground between the
investor-friendly sole-effect test and the purpose test's permissive
attitude toward regulation.238 This method is founded on the ideal
of proportionality between the public and private interests and
the principle that "no one shall be deprived of his possessions ex-
cept in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law."239 An International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes tribunal relied on the conciliatory approach to deny a
233 Sempra Energy, ICSID ARB/02/16 84 at 1 285.
234 Sedco, Inc v National Iranian Oil Co, 9 Iran-US Cl Tribunal Rep 248, 275 (1985).
235 See Dani and Akhtar-Khavari, 22 Widener L Rev at 16-18 (cited in note 222).
236 2012 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Treaty between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of Investment *41 (US Trade Representative, 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.ccV9RS-JTW4.
237 Methanex Corp v United States, 44 ILM 1345, 1456 (2005).
238 Dani and Akhtar-Khavari, 22 Widener L Rev at 20-22 (cited in note 222).
239 Id at 21, quoting Protocol I to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Art 1, 213 UNTS 262, 262 (1952).
[84:13791416
Between Here and There
takings claim brought by a Spanish-owned industrial waste
management company against Mexico for refusing to renew its
operating permit for a landfill located near an urban center. It
concluded that the "neutralization of the investment's economic
and business value" was not proportional to threats that "do not
pose a present or imminent risk to the ecological balance or to
people's health."240 The conciliatory approach has been applied by
other arbitral bodies in several recent, high-profile cases but has
not resolved the overall uncertainty surrounding the contours of
international takings law.241
To reiterate, these three tests, which are aimed at distin-
guishing indirect takings from ordinary exercises of police pow-
ers, are not relevant to exclusionary buffer zones, which are akin
to direct takings. Israel's no-go zone, for example, unquestionably
exacts a direct expropriation of private Palestinian land that it
converts into an Israeli defense apparatus. Exclusionary buffer
zones therefore unambiguously qualify as direct takings without
need for the intricate analyses described above.
Alternatively, an application of the tests to demilitarized
buffer zones is an appropriate and illuminating exercise. The end
result is that, despite the intrusiveness of certain applicable re-
strictions, demilitarized buffer zones are unlikely to qualify as in-
direct takings under any of the three. A tribunal applying the
sole-effects test might be sympathetic to the resultant reductions
in property value and alienability, but a claimant would have
difficulty showing deprivation of "substantially all of the benefit"
of property in a demilitarized buffer zone. The purpose test is even
less forgiving provided that the state can concoct some public-
interest rationale, such as national security. The conciliatory ap-
proach, which requires an inquiry into the proportionality of the
state's actions, might be the most promising avenue. In balancing
the competing public and private interests, a fact-intensive in-
quiry would be required in order to determine whether a demili-
tarized buffer zone is the least invasive means of achieving the
goal of public safety. This would require a showing that the
restrictions on civil rights and freedom of movement are necessi-
tated by and proportionate to the national security imperatives at
stake.
240 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, 43 ILM 133, 172
(ICSID 2004).
241 Dani and Akhtar-Khavari, 22 Widener L Rev at 30-32 (cited in note 222).
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B. Assessing the Legality of Takings Accomplished by
Externally Imposed, Exclusionary Buffer Zones
Takings are generally permitted by international law provided
that they are: (a) taken for a public purpose, (b) nondiscriminatory,
(c) in accordance with international law, and (d) compensated.242
Legal liability attaches for a violation of any of these conditions.243
There has been curiously little discussion of the legitimacy of per-
missible state purposes, leaving the door open for states to justify
buffer zones as serving their public interests through territorial
gain or the advancement of foreign policy preferences. The non-
discrimination prong is also not likely to be an obstacle. Although
some buffer zones, such as humanitarian buffer zones, selectively
apportion benefits (such as safe harbor) and costs (such as deny-
ing access to suspected combatants), "[i]nternational courts and
tribunals do not apply the non-discrimination rule as a per se
bar."244 The third factor-the general compliance of buffer zones
with international law-has already been discussed in Parts II
and III of this Comment.
Even if conditions (a) through (c) are satisfied, a buffer zone
that effects a taking is legal only with adequate compensation.
South Korea, home to the world's longest-standing buffer zone,
offers a rare instance of at least partial compensation for people
affected by a buffer zone: villagers within the DMZ are exempt
from taxation and military conscription. 24 But this is an excep-
tional case. 246
Typically, the creation of buffer zones is not accompanied by
any compensation, and regardless, it is not clear how compensa-
tion would be calculated. Because there are no international rules
regarding property rights, the law of the land (lex situs) pre-
vails.247 In international takings involving private foreign compa-
nies, this results in the alien being left at the mercy of the host
country to determine the appropriate compensation. But this
242 Appleton, 11 NYU Envtl L J at 42 (cited in note 217).
243 Id.
244 Jon A. Stanley, Comment, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory
Takings as Defined in International Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 15 Emory Intl L Rev 349, 378 (2001).
245 See Onishi, Taesung Village Journal (cited in note 178).
246 The residents of Norway's Svalbard pay only local taxes, but this seems to be more
in homage to the peculiar sovereignty-sharing arrangement in the islands than to the
hardships endured. See Rossi, 15 Wash U Global Stud L Rev at 110 (cited in note 58).
247 Annette D. Elinger, Expropriation and Compensation: Claims to Property in East
Germany in Light of German Unification, 6 Emory Intl L Rev 215, 226-29 (1992).
1418 [84:1379
Between Here and There
system would be more just in the buffer zone context because cit-
izens, not aliens, are always the adversely affected party.
C. Legal Remedies for Unlawful Buffer Zone Takings
From an international-law standpoint, there is little that can
be done to provide remedies for the victims of takings committed
by their own governments. However, several states have volun-
tarily provided compensation for mass takings. South Africa24s
and Colombia,249 for example, have each instituted land restitu-
tion and reparations programs to mixed success. In South Africa,
this process was initiated at a moment of national reckoning as it
transitioned forward from its apartheid past. 25 0 For Colombia, the
impetus was a crisis of internally displaced persons.25 1 Cyprus and
Egypt might conceivably follow these examples with respect to
their own populations.
International law does have value when buffer zone takings
are accomplished by a foreign government. While international
takings litigation today is primarily brought by companies or in-
vestors who lose property, there is nothing preventing actions
from being filed by private individuals or, more likely, by states
or organizations acting on their behalf. One forum in which these
cases might be pursued is the ICJ. Seventy-two states have ac-
ceded to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction,22 while all others may
voluntarily accept its jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis.253 Re-
gardless of the parties' consent, the UNSC may enforce the opin-
ions of the ICJ at its discretion,24 though permanent members,
such as the United States, are free to exercise their veto power. 255
Because only states may bring suits before the ICJ, a takings
claim in that forum would need to be brought by a government on
behalf of its citizens.256 Because buffer zones are of particular
248 See Bernadette Atuahene, We Want What's Ours: Learning from South Africa's
Land Restitution Program 26-27 (Oxford 2014).
249 See generally Isaura Velez, Comment, Law of Victims and Land Restitution:
Colombia's Ambitious Law Faces Implementation Challenges, 9 FIU L Rev 451 (2014).
250 Atuahene, We Want What's Ours at 59 (cited in note 248).
251 Velez, Comment, 9 FIU L Rev at 459-62 (cited in note 249).
252 See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory (ICJ),
archived at http://perma.cc/FMF8-QEL2. See also UN Charter Art 94(2).
253 Statute of the International Court of Justice Art 36(1), 59 Stat 1055, 1060, Treaty
Ser No 933 (1945).
254 UN Charter Art 94(2).
255 UN Charter Art 27.
256 See Frequently Asked Questions (ICJ), archived at http://perma.cc/2SCR-DPEZ
("Only States are eligible to appear before the Court. . . . However, a State may take up
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import to Palestinians, it bears mentioning that Palestine is not
authorized to proceed before the ICJ because it is classified by the
UN General Assembly as a nonmember observer state. 2 7 As an
alternative to the ICJ, individuals and advocacy groups support-
ing their causes have made frequent usage of regional human-
rights courts.
Winning a judgment does not guarantee that compensation
will be paid, but compliance is fairly common. A 2010 survey of
decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights revealed
that orders for monetary economic reparations received full com-
pliance in 58 percent of cases. 28 Compliance with ICJ judgments
is significantly higher, despite the UNSC never having taken en-
forcement action.259 In addition, a number of transnational mass
claims processes, like the IUSCT and the UN Compensation
Commission (UNCC), have proved adept at resolving specific con-
troversies between states.26 0
Even when enforcement is anemic, the judgments issued by
international-law arbiters carry an expressive value, shaping
global norms and contributing to the development of customary
law. Lawsuits can be a particularly powerful way to "name and
shame" violators of international law, publicizing abuses and
placing moral pressure on their perpetrators. Some scholars have
suggested that states internalize prevailing legal norms through
a subconscious process of "acculturation," in which they conform
their behavior to their normative environment.261 Others theorize
that states choose to abide by international law as a means of
signaling their goodwill to other states and boosting their
reputations.262
the case of one of its nationals and invoke against another State the wrongs which its
national claims to have suffered at the hands of the latter.").
257 See General Assembly Grants Palestine Non-Member Observer State Status at UN
(UN, Nov 29, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/S9HV-36K6.
258 Fernando Basch, et al, The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human
Rights Protection: A Quantitative Approach to Its Functioning and Compliance with Its
Decisions, 10 Sur Intl J Hum Rts 9, 19 (2010).
259 See The Rule of Law: Can the Security Council Make Better Use of the International
Court of Justice? *6-7 (Security Council Reports, Dec 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/
TBF6-5X33.
260 See Arturo J. Carrillo and Jason S. Palmer, Transnational Mass Claim Processes
(TMCPs) in International Law and Practice, 28 Berkeley J Intl L 343, 351-57, 365-72
(2010).
261 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and Inter-
national Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L J 621, 626-27 (2004).
262 See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J Legal Stud 83, 88-94 (2002).
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For tribunals engaged in this type of litigation, it is worth
considering joint liability regimes found in tort law. Although
takings are usually considered a creature of property law, there
is a striking analogy to tort law when placed in the international
context. A taking effected by one state against another is little
different from the sorts of interpersonal injuries commonly known
as torts, with the exception that the actors are states rather than
private parties. In keeping with this analogy, it is fitting to apply
tort law's comparative fault concept to buffer zones rather than a
property-law regime. Professor Ronald Coase's canonical theori-
zation of "the reciprocal nature" of land use incompatibility23 is
readily transferable to unilaterally imposed buffer zones. In con-
crete terms, when one state feels compelled to install a buffer zone
along its border, it is usually a defensive strategy in response to
a perceived threat stemming from a neighboring state. When
framed this way, it stands to reason that the neighbor bears at
least partial responsibility for the existence of the buffer zone. In
other words, "it takes two to tort."264
There is in fact a growing body of literature on nuisance
abatement takings, though it is more often focused on ensuring
that an innocent landlord is not punished for the crimes of her
tenant.265 If applied to unilaterally imposed buffer zones, the sit-
uation would be reversed, focusing on ensuring that the party
executing the taking is not punished (by full liability) for the
crimes of the territorial sovereign. To provide a realistic example,
imagine that the state of Palestine (once again bracketing the
issue of Palestinian statehood) sues Israel at the ICJ for its no-go
zone on behalf of H.A. and others similarly situated. If Israel is
found to have committed an illegal taking, it will have to provide
compensation to Palestine, which would then be allocated to H.A.
and his neighbors. Israel might then file a counterclaim against
Palestine for its failure to rein in the rocket attacks and terror
tunnels that necessitate the no-go zone in Israel's eyes.
263 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 2 (1960) (claiming the fact
that legal choices inevitably will harm either one party or the other, regardless of the rule,
gives the issue a "reciprocal nature").
264 Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va L
Rev 771, 822 (1982).
265 See generally, for example, Carmon M. Harvey, Comment, Protecting the Innocent
Property Owner: Takings Law in the Nuisance Abatement Context, 75 Temp L Rev 635
(2002); B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing
Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 Case W Reserve L Rev 679 (1992).
2017] 1421
The University of Chicago Law Review
It is conceivable that Egypt, should it opt to compensate its
citizens for the taking effected by its self-imposed exclusionary
buffer zone, would seek contribution from Palestine under a sim-
ilar theory. Logically, Egypt's claim would seem even stronger
than Israel's. Facing similar security threats from Gaza, Israel
elected to burden Palestinian citizens while Egypt opted to bur-
den its own citizens. It would be a strange result to allow Israel
to then offset the costs of compensating Gazans by collecting from
Palestine while not allowing Egypt to do the same with respect to
the compensation of its citizens.
A limitation of this theory when applied internationally is
that it holds up only when the threatening conduct is attributable
to the state; otherwise, the state cannot be expected to contribute
to the compensation of its citizens.266 The conduct of a nonstate
actor may be attributed to the state by showing either that: (1) the
relevant "acts or omissions [were committed by] individuals exer-
cising the state's machinery of power and authority," or that
(2) "the state ... fail[ed] to exercise due diligence in preventing or
reacting to such acts or omissions."267
This Part has contended that exclusionary buffer zones can
be treated as takings under international law. This includes both
externally imposed buffer zones, in which a foreign state directly
intrudes on sovereignty, and self-imposed buffer zones, in which
the intrusion is more indirect but hardly less coercive. This novel
theory provides an alternative path for civilians seeking compen-
sation for their losses and deterrence against future persecution.
CONCLUSION
Despite their pervasive usage in international politics, buffer
zones are not easily accommodated by international law. Founded
on the fundamental precept of state sovereignty, international
law does not readily account for the prolonged existence of no-
man's-land, where sovereignty is incomplete or shared. Nor does
it anticipate the resolution of conflict by arrival at a settlement
266 Seeking recovery from a nonstate actor is theoretically a viable option as well, but
such defendants are likely to be unidentified or judgment-proof.
267 Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution
and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 NYU J Intl L & Pol 265, 268 (2004) (quotation
marks and emphasis omitted).
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more closely resembling a tense stalemate than an enduring peace.
Buffer zones are thus a sui generis political category not fully cap-
tured by the conventional laws of war or of foreign relations.
Nonetheless, the first step toward the attenuation of an
international order based on absolute sovereignty and classical
just war theory has already been taken in the development of the
"responsibility to protect" doctrine in humanitarian law.268 It is
not a far stretch from there to extend the operant principles of
international law into regions defined by restraints on sover-
eignty in an effort to clarify their legal status. Jus ad bellum prin-
ciples enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter can be applied
to assess the legality of buffer zones imposed without mutual con-
sent. By the same token, jus in bello rules, derived primarily from
the Geneva Conventions, prescribe the boundaries of appropriate
state behavior with respect to civilians in buffer zones. Recognizing
that the damage caused by buffer zones can also be economic, this
Comment has explored the possibility of takings lawsuits, finding
them more likely to be viable in cases of exclusionary buffer zones.
For civilians trapped along these geopolitical fault lines, the
theorization of their legal rights begun here could provide a path-
way to empowerment and progress.
268 See Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based So-
lution to a Humanitarian Crisis, 48 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 53, 82-84 (2016) (describing
the "growing support for ... the 'Responsibility to Protect' [principle, which] would require
the international community to intervene in cases of severe oppression").
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